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Abstract
Term-modal logic uses modal operators that are indexed with terms of the language,
which allows for quantification over these operators. Term-modal deontic logics
(TMDL) can capture reasoning with rules, directed, and undirected obligations. Us-
ing the rich language of TMDL, we identify different types of deontic conflicts between
directed obligations and describe reasoning in the face of these conflicts. We develop
several monotonic logics in the TMDL family and show that none is capable of cap-
turing all plausible deontic principles, while also being conflict-tolerant. To remedy
this we develop several non-monotonic extensions in the format of adaptive logics.
We end by isolating one of these, TMDLm, and commenting on it.
Keywords: Conflict-tolerant deontic logic, term-modal logic, first-order, undirected
obligations, directed obligations.
1 Introduction
In deontic reasoning, one often encounters conflicting obligations. These con-
flicting obligations do not always result from conflicting moral theories or legal
systems. Take, for example, the commonly accepted general rule: ‘Doctors
have an obligation to their patients to benefit the health of these patients’. 3
Taken on its own, this rule is perfectly consistent. However, in certain specific
1 stef.frijters@ugent.be Stef Frijters holds a PhD grant of the Research Foundation - Flanders
on the research project “Towards a more integrated formal account of actual ethical reasoning,
with applications in medical ethics.” (G0D2716N).
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the Research Foundation - Flanders (1167619N).
3 We have a distributive reading of this rule, instead of a collective one. Thus we interpret it
as “Every individual doctor has an obligation to each of their patients to benefit the health
of that patient.” and not as “The group of all doctors have an obligation . . . ” or “Each
doctor has an obligation to the group of all of his/her patients . . . ”. This sentence is also
not meant to be interpreted as a generic sentence.
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situations it can lead to deontic conflicts. Let us illustrate this with an example
loosely based on the Manchester twins case [14,11], summarised by Kaveny: 4
A pair of conjoined twins, known by the pseudonyms of “Jodie” and “Mary,”
were born in Manchester, England, hospital in August 2000. Mary’s heart
and lungs were essentially non-functioning; she was entirely dependent upon
her connection with her stronger sister for survival. But Jodie’s cardiovascu-
lar system could not continue to do the work necessary to support both ba-
bies indefinitely. Physicians predicted that without an operation to separate
the twins, both babies soon would die, probably before their first birthday.
Unfortunately, however, the surgical separation would be able to save only
Jodie. Although likely to need several reconstructive operations, she was
predicted to live a long and virtually normal life once her body was liberated
from the burden of providing life support to her sister. Mary’s fate would be
very different; she was predicted to die in the course of the procedure. [11,
p. 115]
In this specific situation, benefitting Jodie’s health implies performing the
operation, while benefitting Mary’s health implies refraining from it. Both
Jodie and Mary are patients of the same physician. 5 Thus, this physician has
an obligation to Jody to perform the operation, and an obligation to Mary not
to do so: a genuine deontic conflict [7].
We define a deontic conflict as a situation in which multiple obligations hold
that are individually, but not jointly fulfillable. In our example, the physician
can perform the surgery, or she can refrain from it, but she cannot do both.
Thus, these two obligations are individually fulfillable, but not jointly. This
differs from a situation in which one is faced with multiple obligations none of
which is fulfillable. These are excluded by our definition of a deontic conflict.
We can be more precise about the kind of deontic conflict with which the
physician is faced. This is a conflict between directed obligations. A directed
obligation is characterized by the fact that it has both a bearer and a counter-
party. The bearer of an obligation is the person who is (in principle) blamed
if the obligation is not fulfilled. In the Manchester Twins case, the physician
is the bearer of both conflicting obligations. A counterparty is the person to
whom the bearer has the obligation [10,5]. In the Manchester twins case, Jodie
is the counterparty to the directed obligation that the physician has to operate.
Mary is the counterparty to the directed obligation that the physician has to
not operate.
Under normal circumstances, i.e. at least when there are no conflicts, it
is plausible that directed obligations imply undirected obligations. With undi-
rected obligations, we mean obligations that are only tied to a bearer and not
to a counterparty [10,5]. In this paper we consider undirected obligations to be
4 We say that this example is ‘loosely based on’ the case, as the actual case was much more
complicated than this summary suggests [14,11].
5 In reality there was a team of physicians, all responsible for both Jodie and Mary, but we
make abstraction of this.
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action guiding in the sense that they should not offer contradictory demands
[20]. Suppose that a has an obligation toward b to tutor b’s daughter c (as a has
promised b to do so). This directed obligation normally implies the undirected
obligation on the part of a to tutor c. Such an implication is, however, not so
straightforward in cases with a deontic conflict between directed obligations.
In this paper we develop several logics with the aim of capturing reasoning
with possibly conflicting directed obligations. The logics should enable us to
derive conflicts from general premise sets, while at the same time being weak
enough not to trivialize these conflicts. Specifically, we will develop term-modal
deontic logics (TMDL) in the vein of [5], based on the more general framework
of term-modal logics [4].
Term-modal logics are first-order modal logics with modal operators that
are indexed by terms of the language (variables and constants). This allows
one to quantify over (the indexes of) modal operators. In [5], these term-modal
operators are given a deontic interpretation, to allow for the formalisation of
general deontic rules, directed, and undirected obligations. However, the logic
presented in [5] is not conflict-tolerant. To develop conflict-tolerant TMDL,
we will use the neighborhood semantics for term-modal logics developed in [6],
instead of the relational semantics of [4] and [5].
The paper is organised as follows. We begin in Section 2 by setting out
DE, a very weak term-modal deontic logic. In the same section, we also dis-
cuss a number of monotonic extensions of DE. These logics all allow us to
derive directed obligations from more general premises and to capture differ-
ent principles of reasoning with both directed and undirected obligations. The
next section is devoted to deontic conflicts. We distinguish two kinds of con-
flicts between directed obligations and then describe reasoning in the face of
these conflicts. We show that the monotonic logics of Section 2 cannot at the
same time capture all plausible principles, while also tolerating conflicts. To
remedy this, Section 4 is devoted to defeasible versions of two principles of
deontic logic. We show how we can use these to extend the monotonic logics
to non-monotonic adaptive logics [1,2,3,19]. We end the paper by presenting
some avenues of future research (Section 5).
2 A family of monotonic term-modal deontic logics
This section is divided into four subsections. The first of these presents the
formal language that will be used in all of the logics in this article. Section
2.2 is dedicated to a semantic characterization of the weakest logic that we
present: DE. A sound and complete axiomatisation of DE is given in Section
2.3. After this we discuss some other plausible principles of deontic logic and
the ways in which we can extend DE to obtain these.
2.1 The formal language and its interpretation
Let C = {a, b, . . .} be a countable set of constants and V = {x, y, . . .} a count-
able set of variables. We let α, β, α1, . . . range over C and ν, ξ, ν1, . . . over V .
Let T = C ∪ V be the set of terms and let θ, κ, θ1, . . . be the metavariables
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ranging over it. For each n ∈ N, let Pn be a countable set of n-ary predicate
symbols and let P denote the union of all Pn. Note that our language includes
propositional variables, i.c. the 0-ary predicate symbols.
The formal language L is defined by the following Backus-Naur form, where
Π ∈ Pn, θ, κ ∈ T and ν ∈ V :
ϕ ::= Π(θ1, . . . , θn) | θ = κ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Oθϕ | Oθκϕ | (∀ν)ϕ | [U]ϕ
The other Boolean connectives are defined in the standard way. Additionally,
(∃ν)ϕ =df ¬(∀ν)¬ϕ, Pθϕ =df ¬Oθ¬ϕ, Pθκϕ =df ¬Oθκ¬ϕ and 〈U〉ϕ =df ¬[U]¬ϕ.
We will write θ 6= κ instead of ¬(θ = κ). 6
The notions of free and bound variables are as usual, with two additions
(cf. Fitting et al. [4]): (1) The free occurrences of variables in Oθϕ are all free
occurrences of variables in ϕ and in addition θ if θ is a variable, and (2) the free
occurrences of variables in Oκθϕ are θ, if θ is a variable, κ, if κ is a variable, and
all free occurrences of variables in ϕ. A wff ϕ is a sentence iff all the variables
in ϕ are bound. Let S be the set of sentences of L.
We interpret Obaϕ as the directed obligation ‘a has an obligation towards b
that ϕ’ and Oaϕ as the undirected obligation ‘a has an obligation that ϕ’. We
will only use terms to refer to agents, and not to other objects, such as apples.
In this way we can avoid being able to express sentences such as ‘this apple has
an obligation’.
[U] is a universal modal operator and we interpret [U]ϕ as ‘ϕ is settled
true’. This operator allows us to express more conflicts. As an example, we
can look back at the tutoring case. Here, a had promised b to tutor c, say at
three in the afternoon. As a result, a has an obligation towards b that a tutors
c at three in the afternoon. Suppose that a has also promised their friend d
to meet for an afternoon of playing computer games. The resulting (directed)
obligation conflicts with the obligation that a has towards c, but only because
it is impossible to fulfill both obligations. This is not a logical impossibility,
but for all intents and purposes it is settled true that b does not both tutor c
at three and also meets d for an afternoon of playing computer games. We can
express this with the [U]-operator.
L allows for a great deal of precision. Let Sx be interpreted as ‘x performs
the surgery’. In L we can express that it is obligatory for our physician (a),
to perform the surgery, OaSa, or that she has this obligation towards Jodie
(j), OjaSa. L also has the expressive power to formalise sentences where the
agent of the obligatory action is not the bearer of the obligation, such as in
‘it is obligatory for the head of the hospital, b, that someone else performs
the surgery’: Ob(∃x)(x 6= b ∧ Sx). 7 It is also possible to distinguish ‘there is
someone for whom it is obligatory to perform the surgery’, (∃x)OxSx, from ‘it
6 Note that the brackets around (θ = κ) are strictly speaking unnecessary.
7 The sentence ‘it is obligatory for the head of the hospital, b, that someone else performs
the surgery’ should not be confused with ‘it is obligatory for the head of the hospital, b,
that b brings it about that someone else performs the surgery’. In the second sentence the
agent of the obligatory action is also the bearer of the obligation, whereas that is not the
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is obligatory for someone that someone performs the surgery’, (∃x)Ox(∃y)Sy.
Finally, we can express general rules such as the one from the introduction, i.e.
that if x is a patient of y (Pxy), then y has an obligation towards x to benefit
the health of x (Byx): (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy → OxyByx).
2.2 DE, the weakest logic
We now present a semantic characterization of DE, the weakest logic in the
TMDL-family. These semantics are based on the neighborhood semantics for
term-modal logics in [6]. A DE-model is a tuple M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉.
W is a state domain, consisting of possible worlds w,w1, . . . and A is an agent-
domain, consisting of agents p, p1, p2, . . .. Both are non-empty and are allowed
to be at most countably infinite. I is an interpretation function. The actual
world wa is used to determine validity in the model (Definition 2.6, this becomes
important in Section 4).
Definition 2.1 A DE-model is a tuple M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉, where:
1. W 6= ∅
2. A 6= ∅
3. NP : W ×A → ℘(℘(W )) is a neighborhood function of M
3.1 for all w ∈ W and p ∈ A: if X ∈ NP (w, p) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ W , then
Y ∈ NP (w, p)
3.2 for all w ∈W and p ∈ A: W ∈ NP (w, p)
3.3 for all w ∈W and p ∈ A: ∅ /∈ NP (w, p)
3.4 for all w ∈W and p ∈ A: if X,Y ∈ NP (w, p), then X ∩ Y ∈ NP (w, p)
4. ND : W ×A×A → ℘(℘(W )) is a neighborhood function of M
4.1. For all w ∈W and p1, p2 ∈ A: ∅ /∈ ND(w, p1, p2)
5. I is an interpretation function such that:
5.1. I : T → A
5.2. I : Pn ×W → ℘(An) for every natural number n ∈ N such that 1 ≤ n
5.3. I : P0 → ℘(W )
6. wa ∈W .
The neighborhood function NP assigns to each world-agent pair a set of
propositions that are obligatory for this agent (each proposition being a set
of worlds). This will be used to interpret the undirected obligation operator.
NP has a number of conditions. The first of these ensures inheritance: if a
proposition is obligatory, then what necessarily follows from this proposition
will also be obligatory. The second condition ensures that what is necessary
is obligatory, and the third ensures that what is impossible cannot be obliga-
tory. The final condition corresponds to aggregation: if two propositions are
obligatory, then their conjunction is obligatory as well. Taken together, this
case in the first sentence. That obligations exist where the bearer is not the agent of the
obligatory action has been argued in [5,12,10]. To properly express the second sentence,
we could extend our language with a term-modal ‘bring it about’-operator. The technical
results in [6] combined with the neighborhood semantics of [9] allow one to give a sound and
complete logic for this extended language. However, since this extension is not essential for
what follows, we leave a development of this approach for future work.
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means that the undirected obligation operator is as as the obligation operator
of standard deontic logic.
The neighborhood function ND assigns to every triple consisting of a world
and two agents a set of propositions that are obligatory for the first agent
towards the second agent. Condition 4.1. ensures that what is obligatory, is
also possible. The reason for this condition is that we do not want the logic
to model unfulfillable directed obligations. We defined a conflict as a situation
in which multiple (directed) obligations hold that can each be individually
fulfilled, but which are not jointly fulfillable. The ought-implies-can principle
for directed obligations that is expressed by condition 4.1. ensures that all
directed obligations can indeed be individually fulfilled.
To interpret quantifiers, we define ν-alternatives, before we give the
semantic clauses. As usual, for any ϕ ∈ L and DE-model M =
〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉, JϕKM =df {w ∈W |M,w  ϕ}.
Definition 2.2 [ν-alternative] For any ν ∈ V , M ′ = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I ′, wa〉 is
a ν-alternative to M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉 iff I ′ differs at most from I in
the member of A that I ′ assigns to ν.
Definition 2.3 [Semantic Clauses] For any DE-model M =
〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉:
SC1 M,w |= P (θ1, . . . , θn) iff 〈I(θ1), . . . , I(θn)〉 ∈ I(P,w)
SC1’ M,w |= P iff w ∈ I(P )
SC2 M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w 6|= ϕ
SC3 M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ or M,w |= ψ
SC4 M,w |= θ = κ iff I(θ) = I(κ)
SC5 M,w |= Oθϕ iff JϕKM ∈ NP (w, I(θ))
SC6 M,w |= Oκθϕ iff JϕKM ∈ ND(w, I(θ), I(κ))
SC7 M,w |= (∀ν)ϕ iff for every ν-alternative M ′: M ′, w |= ϕ
SC8 M,w |= [U]ϕ iff M,w′ |= ϕ for all w′ ∈W .
In the following three definitions we define semantic consequence, validity
and validity in a model. In this last definition, we use the actual world.
Definition 2.4 Where Γ ⊆ S and ϕ ∈ S, ϕ is a semantic consequence of
Γ, Γ  ϕ, iff for every DE-model M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I〉 and w ∈ W : if
M,w |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ, then M,w |= ϕ.
Definition 2.5 Where Γ ⊆ S and ϕ ∈ S, DE validates ϕ iff for every DE-
model M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉 and w ∈W : M,w |= ϕ.
Definition 2.6 Where ϕ ∈ S, ϕ is valid in a model M , M |= ϕ, iff M,wa |= ϕ
2.3 Axiomatisation of DE
A sound and strongly complete axiomatisation of DE is obtained by closing a
complete axiomatisation of classical propositional logic (CL) with all instances
of the axiom schemata in Table 1 under the rules of Table 2. 8 ϕ(θ/κ) is
8 Soundness and completeness follow from previous results in [6]. See also [4,17,5].
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the result of replacing all free occurrences of κ in ϕ by θ, relettering bound
variables if necessary to avoid rendering new occurrences of θ bound in ϕ(θ/κ).
ϕ(θ//κ) is the result of replacing various (not necessarily all or even any) free
occurrences of θ in ϕ by occurrences of κ, again relettering if necessary [18, p.
57].
(UK) [U](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([U]ϕ→ [U]ψ) (UI) (∀ν)ϕ→ ϕ(α/ν)
(UT) [U]ϕ→ ϕ (REF) α = α
(U5) 〈U〉ϕ→ [U]〈U〉ϕ (SUB) (α = β)→ (ϕ→ ϕ(α//β))
(UBF) (∀ν)[U]ϕ→ [U](∀ν)ϕ (ND) α 6= β → [U]α 6= β
(DREU) (Oβαϕ ∧ [U](ϕ↔ ψ))→ Oβαψ
(DIC) Oβαϕ→ 〈U〉ϕ





(MP) if ϕ→ ψ and ϕ, then ψ
(UG) if ` ϕ→ ψ(α/ν) and α not in ϕ or ψ, then ` ϕ→ (∀ν)ψ.
(UNEC) if ` ϕ, then ` [U]ϕ
Table 2
Rules
There is little that is surprising in this axiomatisation. [U] is an S5-operator,
Oα is a normal modal operator satisfying the ought-implies-can principle and
Oβα is a classical modal operator with the ought-implies-can principle. The other
schemes are familiar from first-order modal logic. What might be surprising
is that we do not have the Barcan formula for the obligation-operators even
though we work with a constant domain semantics. This is a result of using
neighborhood semantics instead of relational semantics [6].
2.4 Some further principles for the directed obligation operator
In this section we discuss four more logical principles for the directed obligation
operator: (DP), necessitation, inheritance and aggregation. Standard deontic
logic (SDL) satisfies the last three, but each of these can also be given up
(see for example [19]). By adding any combination of the four conditions to
Definition 2.1, we can define extensions of DE. We do so in Table 3 on page
10. The first column gives the name of the logic, the next four columns the
conditions that it satisfies.
As we stated in the introduction, under normal circumstances directed and
undirected obligations are related to each other in a natural way. If a has
towards b a directed obligation to tutor c, then a has an undirected obligation
to tutor c. This principle, stating that directed obligations imply undirected
obligations, will be called (DP): Oβαϕ → Oαϕ. We can validate it easily by
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adding the following condition (that we call (dp)): for all w ∈ W , p1, p2 ∈ A
and X ⊆W : if X ∈ ND(w, p1, p2) then X ∈ NP (w, p1).
Necessitation is the principle that anything that is settled true, is also oblig-
atory: [U]ϕ → Oβαϕ. We can validate it by adding the condition (n) to our
models: for all p1, p2 ∈ A and w ∈W : W ∈ ND(w, p1, p2).
Inheritance is the principle: Oβα(ϕ ∧ ψ) → (Oβαϕ ∧ Oβαψ). It is validated
by models satisfying the condition (m): for all w ∈ W and p1, p2 ∈ A, if
X ∈ ND(w, p1, p2) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ W , then Y ∈ ND(w, p1, p2). Note that any
models satisfying condition (m) also validates the principle that we will call
inheritance∗: (Oβαϕ ∧ [U](ϕ→ ψ))→ Oβαψ.
Finally, aggregation (between directed obligations with the same bearer)
says that if ϕ and ψ are obligatory, then their conjunction is also obligatory:
(Oβαϕ∧Oβαψ)→ Oβα(ϕ∧ψ). It corresponds to the condition (c): for all w ∈W ,
p1, p2 ∈ A and X,Y ∈ ND(w, p1, p2), X ∩ Y ∈ ND(w, p1, p2).
3 Deontic conflicts
We distinguish two different types of conflicts between directed obligations,
before discussing the kind of reasoning that is employed when encountering
such conflicts.
3.1 Types of deontic conflict
In the introduction we distinguished deontic conflicts from situations in which
an impossible proposition is obligatory. We see a deontic conflict as a situation
in which two or more obligations hold that are not jointly fulfillable, but neither
of which is impossible to fulfill on its own. In the Manchester twins case, the
doctor has an obligation towards Jodie to perform the surgery, and another
obligation towards Mary not to perform the surgery. In this article, we focus
on such conflicts between directed obligations with the same bearer.
We distinguish two kinds of deontic conflicts between directed obligations
with the same bearer: bilateral and multilateral conflicts. Multilateral conflicts
are conflicts between directed obligations with distinct counterparties (for ex-
ample {ObaQa,Oca¬Qa} or {ObaPa,ObaQa,Oca¬(Qa ∧ Pa)} in a context where
b 6= c). In the Manchester twins case there is such a multilateral conflict:
Mary is the counterparty of one obligation, and Jodie of the other obligation.
Bilateral conflicts are conflicts where all the obligations involved are directed
and where the counterparty is the same for all those obligations (for example
{ObaQa,Oba¬Qa}). 9
Consider the following case of a bilateral conflict: A patient w with cystic
fibrosis is in need of a life-saving blood transfusion by doctor b. However, w
is a Jehovah’s witness, and refuses the transfusion on religious grounds [15,
pp. 34-35]. The same general rule holds as in the Manchester twins case:
‘Doctors have an obligation to their patients to benefit the health of these
9 In this paper we will not consider conflicts between directed obligations with different
bearers, but it is possible to make analogous constructions for these.
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patients’. From this rule and the information at hand it follows that ‘Doctor b
has an obligation towards w to administer a blood transfusion to w’. However,
this time there is also a second rule in play: ‘Doctors have an obligation to
their patients to respect the autonomy of these patients’. Since patient w
refuses a blood transfusion, respecting the autonomy of w necessarily implies
not administering a blood transfusion to w. Hence, b is faced with a bilateral
conflict: b has an obligation towards w to administer the blood transfusion, and
b has another obligation towards w not to administer the blood transfusion.
Not every conflict is a conflict between the obligatoriness of a proposition
and its negation. Sometimes, as in the tutoring and gaming example above,
the incompatibility of obligatory propositions is not due to logical impossibility,
but due to contingent circumstances. We can use the [U]-operator to express
that two propositions are mutually incompatible. At other times, we will have
conflicts between three or more obligations, e.g. {Oad(P ∨ Q),Obd¬P,Ocd¬Q}.
Finally, it is also possible to have existentially quantified formulas as part of a
conflict. Thus, we consider (∃x)(OaxPx ∧ Obx¬Px) to be a multilateral conflict
as well.
Premise sets will usually not explicitly contain formulas that fit neatly into
the definition of deontic conflicts above. Instead, we have to deduce these by
means of deontic reasoning. In the Manchester twins case, the premises are:
(1) all doctors have an obligation to their patients to benefit the health of these
patients, (2) Jodie and Mary are patients of physician a, (3) it is necessary that
if physician a acts to benefit Jodie, then she does perform the surgery and (4)
if physician a acts to benefit Marie, then she does not perform the surgery. We
can express these premises in the language as follows:
(i) (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy → OxyByx)
(ii) Pja ∧ Pma
(iii) [U](Baj → Sa)
(iv) [U](Bam→ ¬Sa)
No combination of these formulas fits the definition of a deontic conflict. We
need a logic that is strong enough to derive a conflict from such a premise
set, but does not lead to triviality once it does so. DE allows us to derive
the conflict {OjaBaj,Oma ¬Bam,¬〈U〉(Baj ∧Bam)} (by (UI), (MP), (UK) and
(UNEC)). 10
3.2 Reasoning in the face of deontic conflicts
When we are faced with a deontic conflict, we do not throw our hands up in the
air and forego any further reasoning. We also do not conclude that everything
is suddenly obligatory. This leads us to our first desideratum: deontic conflicts
should not be trivialized. This means that if we have a deontic conflict in our
premises, we should not be able to derive ⊥.
10With any of the logics in Table 3 that validate inheritance, we can derive {OjaSa,Oma ¬Sa}
as well.
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Any extension of DE that validates aggregation trivialises bilateral con-
flicts. Consider, for example, the premise set {ObaQa,Oba¬Qa}. By aggrega-
tion, we can derive Oba(Qa∧¬Qa). By the ought-implies-can principle, we can
derive 〈U〉(Qa ∧ ¬Qa). By CL and the S5 properties of [U], we derive ⊥.
When an extension of DE validates (DP), then it tolerates none of the
conflicts identified above. From a conflict between directed obligations, we can
derive a conflict between undirected obligations. Since Oα is a normal modal
operator, DE trivialises such conflicts.
Name (m) (c) (n) (dp) bilateral multilateral
DE X X
DM x X X
DC x X
DR x x X
DN x X X
DMN x x X X
DCN x x X
DK x x x X
DE + DP x
DM + DP x x
DC + DP x x
DR + DP x x x
DN + DP x x
DMN + DP x x x
DCN + DP x x x
DK + DP x x x x
Table 3
The different monotonic logics
However, there are other possible desiderata than conflict-tolerance that we
must take into account. For obligations that are not tainted by conflicts we
want to be able to apply all the principles from Section 2.4 that we deem to
be plausible. However, since (DP) and aggregation are incompatible with a
logic that is conflict-tolerant, this means that we need defeasible versions of
these principles. 11 If we find the principle (DP) plausible, then we should, for
example, be able to derive OaQa from {ObaQa} or from {ObaQa,OcaPa,Oda¬Pa},
but not from {ObaQa,Oba¬Qa}. Similarly, if one finds aggregation of directed
obligations plausible, but also wants the logic to be conflict-tolerant, then one
would want to be able to derive Oba(Qa ∧ Pa) from {ObaQa,ObaPa}, but not
Oba(Qa ∧ ¬Qa) from {ObaQa,Oba¬Qa}. This is the second desideratum.
11This kind of problem is typical for the type of solution to normative conflicts that we
propose here. Goble notes the same problem for conflict-tolerant variants of SDL [7, p. 297]:
if the logic is weak enough to be conflict-tolerant, then it does not validate all principles of
SDL, and if the logic does validate all principles of SDL, then it is not conflict-tolerant.
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Finally, we should note that we do not want conflicts between undirected
obligations to be derivable from conflicting directed obligations. In this paper
we are only concerned with conflicts between directed obligations. Our undi-
rected obligations should be action guiding in the sense that they should not
offer contradictory demands [20]. All undirected obligations of an agent should
be jointly fulfillable. Therefore we are only concerned with logics that satisfy
ought-implies-can and aggregation for undirected obligations.
4 Adaptive extensions
The principles (DP) and aggregation seem incompatible with tolerating the
conflicts between directed obligations. Nevertheless, one can argue that these
principles are plausible for obligations not involved in a conflict (cf. the second
desideratum). In this section we develop adaptive logics that take this idea into
account. These logics allow us to apply (DP) or aggregation in unproblematic
cases, but block the application of the same principles for obligations that are
in conflict. 12
In Section 4.1 we explain the basic ideas of adaptive logics, using a toy logic.
Section 4.2 sets out two problems with this toy logic. The last two sections,
4.3 and 4.4, develop adaptive logics based on the conflict-tolerant logics that
were presented in Section 3, while taking the two problems of the toy logic into
account.
4.1 Adaptive logic, a toy example
To explain adaptive logics, we will use a running toy example of such a logic.
The motivating idea behind this toy logic is that we would like to have a logic
where the principle (DP) is blocked only in case the obligations involved are in
conflict with other obligations. For example, we should be able to derive Oaϕ
from {Obaϕ}, but not from {Obaϕ,Oca¬ϕ}. In this last premise set, Obaϕ is part
of a conflict and so applying (DP) would lead to triviality.
Our toy logic uses the standard format of adaptive logics [19]. Every logic
in the standard format is defined by a lower limit logic (LLL), a set of abnor-
malities and an adaptive strategy. For our present purposes the LLL can be
any of the logics in Table 3 that does not validate (DP). The adaptive logic
validates all of the valid formulas of the LLL, so taking a logic that validates
(DP) as LLL will result in an adaptive logic that does not block (DP) in any
circumstance. For this toy example, we will use DK as the LLL.
Abnormalities are those formulas that we want the logic to falsify as often
as possible. How this ‘as often as possible’ is interpreted exactly is determined
by the adaptive strategy. In our case we want all negations of instances of
(DP) to be falsified as long as this does not lead to triviality. So we use
Ω = {Oβαϕ ∧ ¬Oαϕ | α, β ∈ C and ϕ ∈ L} as the set of abnormalities.
12The main advantage of adaptive logic over other non-monotonic formalisms is that adaptive
logics (in the standard format) give us a dynamic proof theory [19, p. 528]. This dynamic
proof theory “explicates the dynamics of defeasible reasoning” [16, p. 9]. (Another advantage
is the transparent handling of premise sets [16, pp. 87-88].)
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For all logics in this section, including our toy logic, we will use the adaptive
strategy known as ‘minimal abnormality’ [19]. To explain this strategy, we first
need some preliminary definitions. We say that a model M is a model of Γ iff
for all ϕ ∈ Γ, M |= ϕ. For any model M , Ab(M) =df {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Ω and M |= ϕ}.
Definition 4.1 An LLL-model M of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no
LLL-model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
The models of our adaptive logic are those models of the LLL that are
minimally abnormal. Take our toy logic and the premise set {ObaQ}. There are
DK models M of this premise set such that Ab(M) = ∅. In all of these models
M |= OaQ (otherwise ObaQ ∧ ¬OaQ ∈ Ab(M) and thus Ab(M) 6= ∅). Hence,
OaQ is a semantic consequence of {ObaQ} in our toy logic. However, if we take
the premise set {ObaQ,Oba¬Q}, then for all LLL-models M : M |= ObaQ∧¬OaQ
or M |= Oba¬Q ∧ ¬Oa¬Q. So OaQ is not a consequence of this premise set.
The standard format of adaptive logic also gives us a proof theory, and
soundness and completeness for our adaptive logic. Due to space constraints
we will not elaborate on this here. Instead, we refer interested readers to [19].
4.2 Two problems with the toy logic
In the previous section, we presented a toy logic that gives us an adaptive
version of (DP). In this section, we present two problems of this toy logic.
Then, in the next section, we will present an adaptive logic that solves these
problems.
The first problem with the toy logic is that it is what adaptive logicians call
a flip-flop. An adaptive logic is a flip-flop iff, for all premise sets from which
an abnormality is derivable, the formulas that are derivable with the adaptive
logic are the same as those derivable with the LLL [19]. In other words, in the
presence of an abnormality, the adaptive logic collapses into the LLL.
To illustrate this, let us take the premise set {ObaPa,Oca¬Pa,OdaQa} as an
example. Here there is a conflict between the obligations that a has towards
b and c. So we would want to block the derivation of OaPa and Oa¬Pa.
However, OdaQa is unproblematic and so we do want OaQa to be derivable.
Sadly, this is impossible in the toy logic. To see this, consider the follow-
ing three abnormalities: Oba(Pa ∨ ¬Qa) ∧ ¬Oa(Pa ∨ ¬Qa), Oca(¬Pa ∨ ¬Qa) ∧
¬Oa(¬Pa ∨ ¬Qa) and OdaQa ∧ ¬OaQa. Each minimally abnormal model val-
idates at least one of these abnormalities and every one of these formulas is
validated in at least one of the minimally abnormal models. Since the last
formula is validated in some minimally abnormal models, one cannot derive
OaQa in the toy logic.
A second problem with the abnormalities of the toy logic can be illustrated
by taking as a premise set {(∃x)OaxPb}. From this, we would want to be
able to derive (∃x)OxPb. However, there are minimally abnormal models of
{(∃x)OaxPb} that do not validate {(∃x)OxPb}.
Take, for instance, a DK-model M = 〈W,A, NP , ND, I, wa〉 where W =
{wa, wb, wc} and A = {p1, p2}. For every w ∈ W and p ∈ A, let NP (w, p) =
{wc}. Let ND(wa, p1, p2) = {wb} and for every 〈w, p, p′〉 ∈ {〈w, p, p′〉 | w ∈
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W and p, p′ ∈ A} \ 〈wa, p1, p2〉, let ND(w, p, p′) = {wc}. Let I be such that
for all θ ∈ T , I(θ) = p2, I(P,wb) = {p2} and I(P,w1) = I(P,w2) = ∅. M
validates (∃x)ObxPb∧¬(∃x)OxPb, but this formula is not an abnormality. M is
a minimally abnormal model of {(∃x)OaxPb} and does not validate (∃x)OxPb,
thus we cannot derive this in our toy logic.
4.3 Adaptive (DP)
The problem of flip-flops is well-known in the study of adaptive logics. We can
use the following solution, taken from [13]. 13
Let La be the literals in L. Where Θ ⊆ La is finite and non-empty, we
define σκθ (Θ) as follows:




Θ′) | Θ′ ⊆ Θ and Θ′ 6= ∅}
We define the set of abnormalities, ΩI , as follows:
ΩI =df {
∨
(σβα(Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite and α, β ∈ C}
This approach gets rid of our flip-flop problem. Recall our example premise
set from above: {ObaPa,Oca¬Pa,OdaQa}. We could not derive OaQa, since there
were minimally abnormal models validating ObaQa ∧ ¬OaQa, as every model
validated at least one of Oba(Pa ∨ ¬Qa) ∧ ¬Oa(Pa ∨ ¬Qa), Oca(¬Pa ∨ ¬Qa) ∧
¬Oa(¬Pa ∨ ¬Qa) and OdaQa ∧ ¬OaQa. However, with the new definition of
abnormalities, the first two of these three formulas are no longer abnormalities,
while the last still is. Thus, models that validate ObaQa∧¬OaQa are no longer
minimally abnormal. Hence, we can derive OaQa.
The second problem with the abnormalities of the toy logic (that is not
solved by taking ΩI as abnormalities) was illustrated by the premise set
{(∃x)OaxPb}. From this, we would want to be able to derive (∃x)OxPb. How-
ever, there are minimally abnormal models of {(∃x)OaxPb} that do validate
{(∃x)OxPb}. To solve both the first and second problem of the toy logic, we
define the following two sets of abnormalities:
Ω1 =df {(∃ν)
∨
(σνα(Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite, α ∈ C and ν ∈ V }
Ω2 =df {(∃ν)(∃ξ)
∨
(σξν(Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite and ν, ξ ∈ V }
Let ΩDP = Ω1 ∪ Ω2. Models that validate {(∃x)OaxPb}, but not {(∃x)OxPb}
are no longer minimally abnormal with these new abnormalities. Hence,
{(∃x)OxPb} is derivable.
If we had taken only Ω2 as our set of abnormalities, then we could not
derive Oaϕ from {Obaϕ}, but only (∃x)Oxϕ. By taking only Ω1, we run into the
opposite problem: not being able to derive (∃x)Oxϕ from {(∃x)Oaxϕ}. Thus,
we need the union of both.
13See also [8,19].
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Taking the set ΩDP as the abnormalities solves both problems. We can use
this set to get a defeasible form of (DP) for any of the logics in Table 3 that
do not validate (DP). We simply take the selected monotonic logic from Table
3 as LLL, ΩDP as the set of abnormalities and minimal abnormality as the
strategy. Each of these logics is tolerant to the same conflicts as its LLL, but
is stronger than its LLL. In particular, it satisfies the second desideratum for
(DP): when there are no conflicts, then we are able to apply (DP).
4.4 Adaptive aggregation
To satisfy desideratum 2 for aggregation of directed obligations, we need an
adaptive form of this aggregation. A first suggestion might be to use as abnor-
malities the set of all formulas of the form Oβαϕ∧Oβαψ∧¬Oβα(ϕ∧ψ). However,
this leads to similar problems as the two we identified in Section 4.2. Luckily,
the solution of these problems is analogous to those presented in Section 4.3
for the adaptive form of (DP).
Again let La be the literals in L and let Θ ⊆ La be finite and non-empty.








K ′) | Θ′ ⊆ Θ,K ′ ⊆ K
and Θ′,K ′ 6= ∅}
Ω1C =df {
∨
(τβα (Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite and α, β ∈ C}
Ω2C =df {(∃ν)(∃ξ)
∨
(τ ξν (Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite and ν, ξ ∈ V }
Ω3C =df {(∃ν)
∨
(τβν (Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite, ν ∈ V and β ∈ C}
Ω4C =df {(∃ν)
∨
(τνα(Θ)) | Θ ⊆ La,Θ 6= ∅,Θ is finite, α ∈ C and ν ∈ V }
ΩC =df Ω
1
C ∪ Ω2C ∪ Ω3C ∪ Ω4C
The flip-flop problem would already have been solved by only taking Ω1C as
our set of abnormalities. This solution is analogous to the one in [13, p. 10]
and can be seen as an adaptation to aggregation of the solution to the flip-flop
problem in Section 4.3.
To solve the second problem we need all four of Ω1c-Ω
4
C . Without Ω
4
c we
would not be able to derive (∃x)Oxa(Pa ∧ Qa) from {(∃x)(OxaPa ∧ OxaQa},
i.e. we would not be able to apply aggregation to formulas with existential
quantification over the counterparty. Similarly, without Ω3C we would not be
able to apply aggregation to formulas with existential quantification over the
bearer, without Ω2C we would have trouble with existential quantification over
both the bearer and the counterparty, and without Ω1C we would have problems
with formulas without existential quantification.
Now we can take any of the monotonic logics from Table 3 that do not
validate aggregation for directed obligations and use this logic as the LLL
of an adaptive logic. We take ΩC as the set of abnormalities and minimal
abnormality as the strategy. The resulting adaptive logic satisfies desideratum
Frijters and De Coninck 15
2 for aggregation and does not suffer from the two problems from Section 4.2.
In addition, it is tolerant to the same conflicts as its LLL.
Let us illustrate that desideratum 2 is satisfied by taking DMN as the LLL.
If we take as premises the set {ObaQa,ObaPa}, then we can derive Oba(Qa∧Pa).
Any models that do not validate Oba(Qa ∧ Pa) are not minimally abnormal,
as they validate the abnormality ObaQa,∧ObaPa ∧ ¬Oba(Qa ∧ Pa). Similarly,
from {ObaQa,ObaPa,Oca¬Pa} we can derive Oba(Qa ∧ Pa). All models of the
premise set that do not validate Oba(Qa ∧ Pa), do validate the abnormality
ObaQa ∧ ObaPa ∧ ¬Oba(Qa ∧ Pa) and are therefore not minimally abnormal. 14
4.5 Combining adaptive (DP) and aggregation
We can also combine adaptive aggregation and adaptive (DP). Take as LLL
any logic from Table 3 that does not validate (DP) nor aggregation for directed
obligations, take as abnormalities ΩC ∪ΩDP and as a strategy minimal abnor-
mality. The resulting logic is tolerant to both kinds of conflicts (as its LLL is
tolerant to both) and satisfies desideratum 2 for both aggregation and (DP).
We consider for a moment the strongest of these logics, the one with DMN as
its LLL. For ease of reference, we will call it TMDLm.
Imagine an extension of the Manchester Twins case where it is necessary
for performing the surgery to prepare surgical equipment, [U](Sa→ Ea). With
TMDLm we can derive from this and the premises (i)-(iv) from Section 3.1 that
a has an obligation towards Jodie to prepare the surgical equipment: By (UI)
and (MP), we can derive OjaBaj from (i). By two applications of inheritance
∗
(see Section 2.4), we first derive OjaSa and then O
j
aEa. This seems appropriate
for cases of multilateral conflicts where it is not clear which obligation (if any)
should be given up. When there is only a multilateral conflict, then we can still
derive the obligations that the bearer has towards each counterparty. However,
when we decide for some extra-logical reason that the obligation not to perform
the surgery prevails, then we might no longer be willing to make this derivation.
5 Conclusion
In this article we distinguished bilateral and multilateral conflicts. We devel-
oped a number of monotonic extensions of the term-modal deontic logic DE,
and showed which of these tolerate what kinds of conflicts. We then noted
that none of the conflict-tolerant extensions validate aggregation of directed
obligations with the same bearer, or the derivation of undirected obligations
from directed obligations. They did not even validate these for obligations that
were not involved in any conflict. Since these principles are arguably plausi-
ble, we developed defeasible versions of (DP) and aggregation. This allows us
to construct non-monotonic logics that validate these principles as much as
possible.
All of this gives us a broad range of logics that tolerate bilateral and mul-
tilateral conflicts. Whatever combination of the principles discussed in Section
14Naturally, any logics whose LLL validates (DP) will trivialise this last premise set.
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2.4 one finds plausible can be used to construct a conflict-tolerant logic. If one
finds inheritance, necessitation, both or neither plausible, then one can use the
conflict-tolerant logic in Table 3 that validates exactly these principles. If, in
addition, one finds aggregation, (DP) or both plausible, then one can add these
as defeasible principles, as was described in Section 4. We see this as the main
result of the present paper.
This opens the door to different avenues of future research. One can also
consider conflicts between directed or undirected obligations with different
bearers. Another option is to involve impersonal obligations, i.e. obligations
not tied to any bearer or counterparty. One could ask whether, in a conflict be-
tween an impersonal obligation and an undirected obligation, one of the kinds
prevails over the other.
It is also possible to consider more involved formalisations of general rules,
based on a more in depth account of conditional obligations. For this article
we have used the material implication to interpret both general rules and con-
ditional obligations. However, this does not take into account the possibility
of exceptions to general rules, nor the problem of contrary-to-duty obligations.
Integrating a richer account of conditional obligations with term-modal deontic
logics might open the way to different conflict-tolerant deontic logics. This is
especially interesting in conjunction with a point made in Section 4.5, that in
the case of a multilateral conflict, TMDLm allows one to derive the obligations
of every bearer-counterparty pair as if there was no conflict. 15
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